Countering China Economic Coercion Act
This bill establishes an interagency task force to respond to the Chinese government's acts of economic coercion.
The task force must oversee the development and implementation of an integrated U.S. government strategy to respond to such acts of economic coercion. The strategy must include an evaluation of the costs such acts have on U.S. businesses and economic performance.
The task force must also report to Congress on the strategy as well as a comprehensive review on the economic tools that the Chinese government uses (or can use) to coerce other governments, non-Chinese companies, and multilateral institutions and organizations.
[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5580 Introduced in House (IH)]
<DOC>
117th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 5580
To establish an interagency task force to respond to People's Republic
of China coercive economic measures, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
October 15, 2021
Mr. Bera (for himself, Mrs. Wagner, Mr. Castro of Texas, Mr. Chabot,
Ms. Titus, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and Mr. Vargas) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To establish an interagency task force to respond to People's Republic
of China coercive economic measures, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Countering China Economic Coercion
Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has used coercive economic measures against governments,
businesses, organizations, other entities, and individuals to
punish them for acting in ways the Government of the PRC sees
as challenging PRC interests, and to pressure or otherwise
influence them to offer policy concessions to the PRC.
(2) In an apparent effort to provide itself more plausible
deniability and greater policy flexibility, the PRC often does
not formally link a foreign policy dispute or grievance to the
coercive measure it uses, opting for informal or extralegal
measures rather than formal, published financial sanctions,
trade controls, or investment restrictions.
(3) The PRC has also increasingly sought to formalize some
of its coercive economic measures through laws and measures
that include strengthening its export control regime through
the enactment of a new Export Control Law and creation of an
Unreliable Entities List.
(4) In 2010, the PRC halted shipments of rare earth
elements to Japan during a standoff over a clash between the
Japan Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing vessel in disputed
waters in the East China Sea.
(5) The PRC targeted Norway after an independent group
awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese
dissident Liu Xiaobo. In addition to freezing diplomatic
relations and halting negotiations over a possible trade deal,
the PRC imposed sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to
restrict Norwegian salmon exports to China. Salmon exports to
China resumed in 2016 only after Norway pledged not to
``support any actions that undermine'' China's core interests
and stated that its own actions had harmed ``mutual trust''.
(6) In 2012, the PRC blocked banana imports from the
Philippines on the pretext of SPS issues and warned Chinese
tourists against visiting the Philippines in response to a
standoff over disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China
Sea.
(7) Following the election of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen
in 2016, the PRC responded to Tsai's unwillingness to
explicitly endorse the terms of the 1992 Consensus by curbing
the number of mainland tourists and students allowed to travel
to Taiwan.
(8) In 2016, the PRC retaliated against Mongolia for
hosting His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama by raising fees on
commodity imports from Mongolia, creating delays at a major
border crossing, and canceling negotiations over a loan to the
Mongolian government.
(9) Following South Korea's 2016 decision to join the
United States in deploying a United States missile defense
system to defend against North Korea's missile threat, the PRC
took the following actions that is estimated to have cost South
Korea $7.5 billion dollars in losses in 2017 alone:
(A) Restricted South Korean entertainment and other
cultural exports from entering China.
(B) Banned the sale of certain South Korea
household products, including cosmetics, high-tech
toilet seats, air purifiers, and food.
(C) Restricted tourism between the two countries by
ordering travel agencies not to provide South Korean
tour packages and by rejecting Korean airlines'
applications to increase charter flights between the
two countries.
(D) Targeted the China business of Lotte, a South
Korean conglomerate, by suspending new factories,
launching cyberattacks against Lotte's website, and
closing significant numbers of Lotte Mart stores in
China for alleged safety violations.
(10) After the Government of Australia called for an
independent inquiry into the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in
2020, the PRC retaliated by imposing tariffs on Australian wine
and barley exports, placing restrictions on other commodities,
and threatening to encourage Chinese students to boycott
Australian universities.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing use
of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies,
organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that
the United States better understand these measures in order to
devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;
(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the
United States Government understand the PRC's coercive economic
measures and hold the PRC accountable, and that additional
business transparency would help the United States Government
and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of
potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and
(3) PRC coercive economic measures creates pressures for
the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United
States national interests and competitiveness.
SEC. 4. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency
task force to be known as the ``Countering Economic Coercion Task
Force'' (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'').
(b) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall--
(A) oversee the development and implementation of
an integrated United States Government strategy to
respond to People's Republic of China (PRC) coercive
economic measures, which shall include--
(i) systematically monitoring and
evaluating--
(I) the costs of such measures on
United States businesses and overall
United States economic performance;
(II) instances in which such
measures taken against a non-PRC entity
has benefitted United States parties;
and
(III) the impacts such measures
have had on United States national
interests; and
(ii) facilitating coordination among
Federal departments and agencies when
responding to such measures as well as
proactively deterring such economic coercion;
(B) consult with United States allies and partners
on the feasibility and desirability of collectively
identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive
economic measures, as well as actions that could be
taken to expand coordination with the goal of ensuring
a consistent, coherent, and collective response to such
measures and establishing long-term deterrence to such
measures;
(C) effectively engage the United States private
sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities
that are susceptible to such PRC coercive economic
measures, on concerns related to such measures; and
(D) develop and implement a process for regularly
sharing relevant information, including classified
information to the extent appropriate and practicable,
on such PRC coercive economic measures with United
States allies, partners, and the private sector.
(2) Consultation.--In carrying out its duties under this
subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the
extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:
(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector.
(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not
represented on the Task Force.
(C) United States allies and partners.
(c) Membership.--The President shall--
(1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the
staff of the National Security Council;
(2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the
staff of the National Economic Council; and
(3) direct the head of each of the following Federal
departments and agencies to appoint personnel at the level of
Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force:
(A) The Department of State.
(B) The Department of Commerce.
(C) The Department of the Treasury.
(D) The Department of Justice.
(E) The Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
(F) The Department of Agriculture.
(G) The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and other appropriate elements of the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
(H) The Securities and Exchange Commission.
(I) The United States International Development
Finance Corporation.
(J) Any other department or agency designated by
the President.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes
the following elements:
(A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic
tools the Government of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce
other governments, non-PRC companies (including United
States companies), and multilateral institutions and
organizations, including the Government of the PRC's
continued efforts to codify informal practices into its
domestic law.
(B) The strategy required by subsection (b)(1)(A).
(C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive
economic measures that captures both--
(i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC
coercive economic measures; and
(ii) the illegitimate use of formal
economic tools.
(D) A comprehensive review of the array of economic
and diplomatic tools the United States Government
employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion
against the United States and United States allies and
partners.
(E) A list of unilateral or multilateral--
(i) proactive measures to defend or deter
against PRC coercive economic measures; and
(ii) actions taken in response to the
Government of the PRC's general use of coercive
economic measures.
(F) An assessment of areas in which United States
allies and partners are vulnerable to PRC coercive
economic measures.
(G) A description of gaps in existing resources or
capabilities for United States Government departments
and agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive
economic measures directed at United States entities
and assist United States allies and partners in their
responses to PRC coercive economic measures.
(2) Interim reports.--
(A) First interim report.--Not later than one year
after the date on which the report required by
paragraph (1) is submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Task Force shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
that includes the following elements:
(i) Updates to information required by
subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1).
(ii) A description of activities conducted
by the Task Force to implement the strategy
required by subsection (b)(1)(A).
(B) Second interim report.--Not later than one year
after the date on which the report required by
subparagraph (A) is submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Task Force shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report
that includes an update to the elements required under
the report required by subparagraph (A).
(3) Final report.--Not later than 30 days after the date on
which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to
the appropriate congressional committees, the Task Force shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and also
make available to the public on the website of the Executive
Office of the President a final report that includes the
following elements:
(A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic measures
and the cost of such coercive measures to United States
businesses.
(B) A description of areas of possible particular
vulnerability for United States businesses and
businesses of United States partners and allies.
(C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort
to counter PRC coercive economic measures.
(D) A list of cases made public under subsection
(e).
(4) Form.--
(A) Initial and interim reports.--The reports
required by paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (2)(B) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(B) Final report.--The report required by paragraph
(3) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(e) Publicly Available List.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall to the extent
practicable make available to the public on the website of the
Executive Office of the President a list of cases in the past
six months in which the PRC is known to have directed coercive
economic measures against a non-PRC entity.
(2) Updates.--The list required by paragraph (1) should be
updated every 180 days, and shall be managed by the Department
of State after the termination of the Task Force under
subsection (f).
(f) Sunset.--
(1) In general.--The Task Force shall terminate at the end
of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final
report required by subsection (d)(3) is submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees and made publicly
available.
(2) Additional actions.--The Task force may use the 60-day
period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of
concluding its activities, including providing testimony to
Congress concerning the final report required by subsection
(d)(3).
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate.
(2) Coercive economic measures.--The term ``coercive
economic measures'' includes formal or informal restrictions or
conditions, such as on trade, investment, development aid, and
financial flows, intended to impose economic costs on a non-
People's Republic of China target in order to achieve strategic
political objectives, including influence over the policy
decisions of a foreign government, company, organization, or
individual.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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