H.R. 3972 — Taiwan Peace and Stability Act

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3972 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3972

To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of Taiwan, and 
                          for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 17, 2021

Mr. Bera (for himself, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Kahele, Mr. Bacon, Mr. Case, and 
 Mr. Womack) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Ways 
 and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 
 in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of Taiwan, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Peace and 
Stability Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy.
     TITLE I--SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
                        INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress on Taiwan's meaningful participation in the 
                            international community.
Sec. 103. Strategy to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in 
                            international organizations.
Sec. 104. Expanding United States-Taiwan development cooperation.
Sec. 105. Appropriate congressional committees.
              TITLE II--ADVANCING TAIWAN'S ECONOMIC SPACE

Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on expanding U.S. economic relations with 
                            Taiwan.
Sec. 202. Legal framework for expanding economic relations with Taiwan.
Sec. 203. Appropriate congressional committees.
              TITLE III--ENHANCING DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN

Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on peace and stability in the Taiwan 
                            Strait.
Sec. 302. Strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.
Sec. 303. Supporting Taiwan's investment in asymmetric capabilities.
Sec. 304. Advancing Taiwan's territorial defense force concept.
Sec. 305. Strengthening Taiwan's civilian defense professionals.
Sec. 306. Appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States has consistently sought to advance 
        peace and stability in East Asia as a central element of U.S. 
        foreign policy toward the region.
            (2) Peace and stability in East Asia has provided the 
        necessary environment for the tremendous economic growth 
        experienced by the region and remains critical to the continued 
        development and prosperity of all people in the Indo-Pacific.
            (3) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8; 22 
        U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'', provided by 
        the United States to Taiwan in July 1982, are the cornerstones 
        of U.S.-Taiwan relations and continue to guide U.S. policy 
        toward Taiwan.
            (4) The Taiwan Relations Act states that it is the policy 
        of the United States to--
                    ``(A) preserve and promote extensive, close, and 
                friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations 
                between the people of the United States and the people 
                on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland 
                and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
                    ``(B) declare that peace and stability in the area 
                are in the political, security, and economic interests 
                of the United States, and are matters of international 
                concern;
                    ``(C) make clear that the United States decision to 
                establish diplomatic relations with the People's 
                Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the 
                future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
                    ``(D) consider any effort to determine the future 
                of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by 
                boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
                security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
                concern to the United States;
                    ``(E) provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive 
                character; and
                    ``(F) maintain the capacity of the United States to 
                resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
                that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
                economic system, of the people on Taiwan.''.
            (5) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 
        especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has 
        conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan 
        diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that 
        threatens to erode U.S. policy and create a fait accompli on 
        questions surrounding Taiwan's future.
            (6) In order to ensure the longevity of U.S. policy and 
        preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their 
        future independently, it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan's 
        diplomatic, economic, and physical space.
    (b) It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the 
        Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic 
        interests of the United States, and are matters of 
        international concern; and
            (2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and 
        stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other 
        forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional 
        stability.

     TITLE I--SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
                        INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical 
        assistance to combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, 
        Ebola, and dengue fever in countries around the world. During 
        the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of 
        personal protective equipment and COVID-19 tests to countries 
        in need.
            (2) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, 
        the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon 
        Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with 
        Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.
            (3) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health 
        Assembly, the decision-making body of the World Health 
        Organization (WHO), as an observer annually between 2009 and 
        2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has 
        increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan 
        was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 
        2021.
            (4) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 
        1.75 million flights and 68.9 million passengers in 2018 and is 
        home to Taiwan Taoyuan International airport, the eleventh 
        busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from 
        participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization 
        (ICAO) since 2013.
            (5) United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2758 
        does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its 
        people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the 
        right to represent the people of Taiwan.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE 
              INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, and is home 
        to 23.5 million people. It is an important contributor to the 
        global community, as a model for democracy, and by providing 
        expertise in global health, international aviation security, 
        emerging technology development, and with forward looking 
        environmental policies;
            (2) multiple United States Government administrations of 
        both political parties have taken important steps to advance 
        Taiwan's meaningful participation in international 
        organizations;
            (3) existing efforts to enhance U.S. cooperation with 
        Taiwan to provide global public goods, including through 
        development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 
        relief in trilateral and multilateral fora is laudable and 
        should continue;
            (4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal 
        barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's meaningful participation 
        in the international community; and
            (5) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with other parts of 
        the global community could be further enhanced through a 
        systematic approach, along with greater attention from Congress 
        and the American public to such efforts.

SEC. 103. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN 
              INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a strategy--
            (1) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participation in a 
        prioritized set of international organizations (IOs); and
            (2) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on 
        foreign governments, IOs, commercial actors, and civil society 
        organizations to comply with its ``One-China Principle'', with 
        respect to Taiwan.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--
            (1) In general.--The strategy required in paragraph (a) 
        shall include:
                    (A) An assessment of the methods the PRC uses to 
                coerce actors to into adhering to its ``One-China 
                Principle.'' The methods shall include those employed 
                against governments, IOs, and civil society 
                organizations. The assessment shall also include 
                pressure on commercial actors, to the extent it is 
                relevant in the context of Taiwan's meaningful 
                participation in IOs.
                    (B) An assessment of the policies of foreign 
                governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify 
                likeminded allies and partners who might become public 
                or private partners in the strategy.
                    (C) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as 
                practicable, to identify IOs that best lend themselves 
                to advancing Taiwan's participation. The analysis shall 
                include, but is not limited to the IOs'--
                            (i) policy on the requirements to obtain 
                        membership and observer status, as well as the 
                        foundational documents defining membership 
                        requirements and observer status within the IO;
                            (ii) participation rules;
                            (iii) processes for developing membership 
                        requirements and participation rules;
                            (iv) policies of current members regarding 
                        Taiwan's political status; and
                            (v) relative reliance on contributions from 
                        the PRC and how it may affect internal decision 
                        making.
                    (D) An evaluation of the feasibility and 
                advisability of expanding economic, security, and 
                diplomatic engagement with nations that have 
                demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded 
                relations with Taiwan, where it aligns with U.S. 
                interests.
                    (E) A survey of IOs that have allowed Taiwan's 
                meaningful participation, including an assessment of 
                whether any erosion in Taiwan's engagement has occurred 
                within those organizations and how Taiwan's 
                participation has positively strengthened the capacity 
                and activity of these organizations, thereby providing 
                positive models for Taiwan's inclusion in other similar 
                forums.
                    (F) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which the U.S. 
                Government will prioritize for using its voice, vote, 
                and influence to advance Taiwan's meaningful 
                participation over the three-year period following the 
                date of enactment of this Act. The list shall be 
                derived from the IOs identified in paragraph (1)(C).
                    (G) A description of the diplomatic strategies and 
                the coalitions the U.S. Government plans to develop to 
                implement paragraph (b)(1)(F).
    (c) Form of Report.--The strategy required in subsection (a) shall 
be classified, but it may include an unclassified summary, if the 
Secretary of State determines it appropriate.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) International organization.--The term ``international 
        organization'' shall include, but is not limited to, UN funds, 
        programs, specialized agencies, entities, and bodies. It shall 
        also include other organizations outside of the UN system, as 
        the Secretary of State or his or her designee deems 
        appropriate, and in consultation with other Federal departments 
        and agencies.
            (2) One-china principle.--The term ``One-China Principle'' 
        shall solely and exclusively refer to the PRC's policy toward 
        Taiwan.
            (3) Civil society organizations.--The term ``civil society 
        organizations'' means international civil society organizations 
        that are critical to maintaining Taiwan's international space 
        and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in 
        the global community.
    (e) Consultation.--The Secretary of State or his or her designee, 
shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees--
            (1) no later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
        this Act, on the list of IOs identified in subsection 
        (b)(1)(C); and
            (2) 180 days after submitting the strategy required in 
        subsection (a), and 180 days thereafter for two years, 
        regarding the development and implementation of the strategy.

SEC. 104. EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.

    (a) In General.--No later than 120 days following the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), in consultation with the U.S. 
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report on cooperation with 
Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development initiatives.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report required in paragraph (a) 
shall include:
            (1) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation 
        mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or DFC, and relevant 
        departments and agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited 
        to Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund 
        (ICDF).
            (2) An assessment of how USAID and DFC development 
        cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan 
        compares to comparable cooperation with partners of similar 
        economic size and foreign assistance capacity.
            (3) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges the 
        cooperation reviewed in paragraph (b)(1) has offered to date. 
        The analysis shall include, but is not limited to--
                    (A) opportunities collaboration has offered to 
                expand USAID and DFC's ability to deliver assistance 
                into a wider range communities;
                    (B) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other relevant 
                agencies and departments in Taiwan, or the 
                organizations' implementing partners have a comparative 
                advantage in providing assistance;
                    (C) opportunities to transition virtual capacity 
                building events with relevant departments and agencies 
                in Taiwan, through the Global Cooperation and Training 
                Framework (GCTF) as well as other forums, into in-
                person, enduring forms of development cooperation.
            (4) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, 
        financial, or administrative barriers to expanding cooperation 
        in trilateral or multilateral development. The analysis shall 
        include, but is not limited to--
                    (A) availability of personnel at the American 
                Institute in Taiwan (AIT) responsible for coordinating 
                development assistance cooperation;
                    (B) volume of current cooperation initiatives and 
                barriers to expanding it;
                    (C) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers facing 
                the United States or other partners to including Taiwan 
                in formal and informal multilateral development 
                cooperation mechanisms;
                    (D) resource or capacity barriers to expanding 
                cooperation facing the United States or Taiwan; and
                    (E) geopolitical barriers that complicate U.S.-
                Taiwan cooperation in third countries.
            (5) Recommendations to address the challenges identified in 
        paragraph (b)(4).
            (6) A description of any additional resources or 
        authorities that expanding cooperation might require.
    (c) Form of Report.--The strategy required in subsection (a) shall 
be unclassified, but it may include a classified annex if the 
Administrator of USAID determines it appropriate.

SEC. 105. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

              TITLE II--ADVANCING TAIWAN'S ECONOMIC SPACE

SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH 
              TAIWAN.

    It is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) expanding U.S. economic relations with Taiwan has 
        benefited the people of both the United States and Taiwan. 
        Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading 
        partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of 
        imports, and a key destination for U.S. agricultural exports;
            (2) further integration, consistent with robust 
        environmental standard and labor rights, would benefit both 
        peoples and is in the strategic and diplomatic interests of the 
        United States; and
            (3) the United States should explore opportunities to 
        expand economic agreements between Taiwan and the United 
        States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates 
        required to support potential future agreements.

SEC. 202. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPANDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days following the date of 
enactment of this Act, the United States Trade Representative, in 
consultation with other Federal departments and agencies as 
appropriate, shall present to the appropriate congressional committees 
a legal template for establishing trade and investment agreements with 
Taiwan that is consistent with the nature of the United States 
relations with Taiwan. Such template shall be designed to be applicable 
to a trade agreement, as well as other forms of trade and investment 
agreements.
    (b) Form of Report.--The report required in subsection (a) shall be 
unclassified, but it may include a classified annex, if appropriate.

SEC. 203. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on 
        Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee 
        on Finance of the Senate.

              TITLE III--ENHANCING DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN

SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TAIWAN 
              STRAIT.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to pursue a policy of 
        promoting peace in the Indo-Pacific for the benefit of the 
        peoples of Asia and of the United States;
            (2) maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is 
        in the national security interest of the United States;
            (3) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through 
        high rates of PRC sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC 
        amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-
        standing U.S. position that differences in cross-Strait 
        relations must be resolved peacefully;
            (4) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be 
        highly destructive and destabilizing, any increase in the risk 
        of conflict demands attention and obligates leaders to 
        reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;
            (5) the United States should work with allies and partners 
        to expand the community of partners involved in building a 
        credible deterrent toward a cross-Strait conflict;
            (6) Taiwan should continue to invest in and implement its 
        asymmetric defense strategy, including but not limited to 
        coastal defense cruise missiles, while also strengthening 
        recruitment and training of its reserve force; and
            (7) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to 
        maintain open and effective crisis communication and risk 
        reduction mechanisms as a means to reduce the risk of 
        misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.

SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.

    (a) In General.--No later than 90 days after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a whole-of-government strategy to enhance 
deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC and 
Taiwan.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--The strategy shall include:
            (1) A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic, 
        economic, and military tools to establish deterrence over a 
        cross-Strait conflict and an assessment of their efficacy.
            (2) An examination of the present and future capabilities 
        of the United States and Taiwan to respond to the potential PLA 
        campaigns against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis 
        shall include an assessment of the progress Taiwan has made in 
        developing the asymmetric capabilities needed to respond to its 
        strategic environment, as well as the additional capabilities 
        and reforms required.
            (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding 
        coordination with U.S. allies and partners to enhance 
        deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The review shall 
        include, but is not limited to, a review of the following 
        matters:
                    (A) Expanding coordination of public or private 
                messaging on deterrence vis-a-vis Taiwan.
                    (B) Coordinating use of economic tools to raise the 
                costs of PRC military action that could precipitate a 
                cross-Strait conflict.
                    (C) Enhancing co-development and co-deployment of 
                military capabilities related to deterrence over a 
                cross-Strait conflict, or enhancing coordinated 
                training of Taiwan's military forces.
            (4) Recommendations on significant additional diplomatic, 
        economic, and military steps available to the U.S. Government, 
        unilaterally and in concert with U.S. allies and partners, to 
        enhance the clarity and credibility of deterrence over a cross-
        Strait conflict.
            (5) A description of any additional resources or 
        authorities needed to implement the recommendations identified 
        in paragraph (5).
    (c) Form of Report.--The strategy required in subsection (b) shall 
be classified, but it may include an unclassified annex, if determined 
appropriate by the President.
    (d) Consultation.--No later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days 
thereafter for seven years, the President or his or her designee, as 
well as representatives from the agencies and departments involved in 
developing the strategy required in paragraph (a) shall consult with 
the appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and 
implementation of the strategy required in this section. The 
representatives shall be at the Undersecretary level or above.
    (e) Definitions.--
            In this section, the term ``potential PLA campaigns'' shall 
        mean--
            (1) a naval blockade of Taiwan;
            (2) an amphibious assault and ground invasion of Taiwan, 
        especially such invasion designed to accomplish a fiat accompli 
        before intervention is possible; and
            (3) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan's outlying islands.

SEC. 303. SUPPORTING TAIWAN'S INVESTMENT IN ASYMMETRIC CAPABILITIES.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days following enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on options to support Taiwan's defense budgeting and procurement 
process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment in 
capabilities aligned with Taiwan's asymmetric defense strategy. The 
report shall include the following:
            (1) A review of technical advisory options for enhancing 
        defense budgeting across Taiwan's military services in Taiwan 
        that is aligned with Taiwan's asymmetric defense strategy.
            (2) An evaluation of any administrative, institutional, or 
        personnel barriers in the United States or Taiwan to 
        implementing the options provided in paragraph (a)(1).
            (3) An evaluation of the most appropriate entities within 
        the U.S. Department of Defense to lead the options provided in 
        paragraph (a)(1).
            (4) An evaluation of the appropriate entities in Taiwan's 
        Ministry of National Defense and its National Security Council 
        to participate in options provided in paragraph (a)(1).
            (5) A description of additional personnel, resources, and 
        authorities in Taiwan or in the United States that may be 
        required to execute the options provided in paragraph (a)(1).
    (b) Form of Report.--The report required in subsection (a) shall be 
classified, but it may include an unclassified summary, if the 
Secretary of Defense determines it appropriate.

SEC. 304. ADVANCING TAIWAN'S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCE CONCEPT.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days following enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on options to strengthen Taiwan's implementation of its 
territorial defense force concept.
    (b) Policy Objectives.--The review shall take into consideration, 
but is not limited to, the following policy goals:
            (1) Advance Taiwan Reserve's Command ability to recruit, 
        train, and equip its forces, including its ability to require 
        and provide regular individual and collective training to all 
        reserve forces.
            (2) Enhance Taiwan's ability to respond to humanitarian 
        disasters.
            (3) Strengthen Taiwan's ability to defend against, and 
        resist if necessary, PRC military aggression.
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--
            (1) A review of options to provide additional technical 
        advice, training, or institution building to support the 
        objectives discussed in subsection (b), and any other 
        appropriate policy objectives.
            (2) An assessment of the policy opportunities and 
        challenges associated with the options provided in paragraph 
        (c)(1).
            (3) An assessment of any statutory or administrative 
        barriers to the options provided in paragraph (c)(1).
            (4) A determination of the most appropriate entities within 
        the U.S. Department of Defense and in the Taiwan Reserve 
        Command to lead the options provided in paragraph (c)(1).
            (5) An evaluation of the capacity of appropriate entities 
        in the U.S. Department of Defense to support the options 
        provided in paragraph (c)(1) and of the Taiwan Reserve Command 
        to absorb the options provided in paragraph (c)(1).
            (6) A description of additional resources and authorities 
        that may be required to execute any of the options provided in 
        paragraph (c)(1).
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required in subsection (a) shall be 
classified, but it may include an unclassified summary, if the 
Secretary of Defense determines it appropriate.

SEC. 305. STRENGTHENING TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN DEFENSE PROFESSIONALS.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days following enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, shall present to the appropriate congressional committees a 
plan for strengthening the community of civilian defense professionals 
in Taiwan.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report shall include the 
following:
            (1) A comprehensive review of existing U.S. Government and 
        non-U.S. Government programmatic and funding modalities to 
        support Taiwan's civilian defense professionals in pursuing 
        professional development, educational, and cultural exchanges 
        in the United States. The review shall include, but is not 
        limited to--
                    (A) opportunities through U.S. Department of State-
                supported programs, such as the International Visitor 
                Leaders Program; and
                    (B) opportunities offered through non-governmental 
                institutions, such as think tanks, to the extent the 
                review can practicably make such an assessment.
            (2) A description of the frequency that civilian defense 
        professionals from Taiwan pursue or are selected for the 
        programs reviewed in paragraph (b)(1).
            (3) An analysis of any funding, policy, administrative, or 
        other barriers preventing greater participation from Taiwan's 
        civilian defense professionals in the opportunities identified 
        in paragraph (b)(1).
            (4) An evaluation of the value expanding the opportunities 
        reviewed in paragraph (b)(1) would offer for strengthening 
        Taiwan's existing civilian defense community, and for 
        increasing the perceived value of the field for young 
        professionals in Taiwan.
            (5) An assessment of options the United States Government 
        could take individually, with partners in Taiwan, or with 
        foreign governments or non-governmental partners, to expand the 
        opportunities reviewed in paragraph (b)(1).
            (6) A description of additional resources and authorities 
        that may be required to execute the options in paragraph 
        (b)(5).
    (c) Form of Report.--The report required in paragraph (a) shall be 
unclassified, but it may include a classified annex, if determined 
appropriate.

SEC. 306. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

    In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee 
        on Armed Services of the Senate.
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