Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act or SHIELD Act - Amends the Federal Power Act to authorize the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), with or without notice, hearing, or report, to order emergency measures to protect the reliability of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure whenever the President issues a written directive or determination identifying an imminent grid security threat.
Directs FERC to consult with governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico regarding implementation of emergency measures.
Prescribes: (1) implementation procedures; and (2) related cost recovery measures affecting owners, operators, or users of either the bulk-power system or the defense critical electric infrastructure.
Directs FERC to require any owner, user, or operator of the domestic bulk-power system to implement measures to protect the system against specified vulnerabilities.
Directs FERC also to order the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to submit reliability standards to: (1) protect the bulk-power system from a reasonably foreseeable geomagnetic storm event or electromagnetic pulse event (EMP); and (2) require entities that own or operate large transformers to ensure their adequate availability to restore promptly the reliable operation of the bulk-power system in the event of destruction or disability as a result of attack or a geomagnetic storm or EMP.
Directs the Secretary of Energy to establish a program to: (1) develop technical expertise in the protection of electric energy systems against either geomagnetic storms or malicious acts using electronic communications or electromagnetic weapons; and (2) share it with owners, operators, or users of systems for the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy located in the United States and with state commissions.
Exempts, for a specified period, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration from any requirement pertaining to either emergency response measures or measures to address grid security vulnerabilities.
[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 668 Introduced in House (IH)]
112th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 668
To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and
electric infrastructure critical to the defense and well-being of the
United States against natural and manmade electromagnetic pulse
(``EMP'') threats and vulnerabilities.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 11, 2011
Mr. Franks of Arizona (for himself, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Hall, Mr.
Lamborn, Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. Akin, Mr. Broun of Georgia, Mr.
Marchant, Mr. Posey, Mr. West, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Bishop of Utah, Mr.
Hunter, Mr. Terry, Mr. Kline, Mr. Daniel E. Lungren of California, Mr.
Stearns, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Turner, Ms. Clarke of New York, Mr.
Garamendi, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Johnson of Ohio, Mr. Jordan,
and Mr. Royce) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on
the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker,
in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To amend the Federal Power Act to protect the bulk-power system and
electric infrastructure critical to the defense and well-being of the
United States against natural and manmade electromagnetic pulse
(``EMP'') threats and vulnerabilities.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Secure High-voltage Infrastructure
for Electricity from Lethal Damage Act'' or the ``SHIELD Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) According to the Report of the Commission to Assess the
Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack
(in this Act referred to as the ``EMP Commission Report''), the
society and economy of the United States are ``critically
dependent upon the availability of electricity.''.
(2) According to the EMP Commission Report, ``continued
electrical supply is necessary for sustaining water supplies,
production and distribution of food, fuel, communications, and
everything else that is part of our economy''.
(3) According to the EMP Commission Report, ``contemporary
U.S. society is not structured, nor does it have the means, to
provide for the needs of nearly 300 million Americans without
electricity.''.
(4) According to the EMP Commission Report, due to the
existing electrical system operating at or near its physical
capacity, ``a relatively modest upset to the system can cause
functional collapse.''.
(5) According to the EMP Commission Report, electromagnetic
pulse (in this Act referred to as ``EMP'') is a threat to the
overall electrical power system.
(6) According to the EMP Commission Report, EMP occurs both
naturally, such as geomagnetic storms, and via manmade devices.
(7) According to the EMP Commission Report, while the
electric infrastructure ``has a degree of durability against .
. . the failure of one or a small number of [electric]
components,'' the current strategy for recovery leaves the
United States ill-prepared to respond effectively to an EMP
attack that would potentially result in damage to vast numbers
of components nearly simultaneously over an unprecedented
geographic scale.
(8) According to the EMP Commission Report, EMP ``may
couple ultimately unmanageable currents and voltages into an
electrical system routinely operated with little margin and
cause the collapse of large portions of the electrical
system.''.
(9) According to the EMP Commission Report, a collapse of
large portions of the electrical system will result in
significant periods of power-outage and ``restoration from
collapse or loss of significant portions of the system [will
be] exceedingly difficult.''.
(10) According to the EMP Commission Report, ``should the
electrical power system be lost for any substantial period of
time . . . the consequences are likely to be catastrophic to
civilian society.''.
(11) According to the EMP Commission Report, ``the
Commission is deeply concerned that [negative] impacts [on the
electric infrastructure] are certain in an EMP event unless
practical steps are taken to provide protection for critical
elements of the electric system.''.
SEC. 3. AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL POWER ACT.
(a) Critical Electric Infrastructure Security.--Part II of the
Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 et seq.) is amended by adding after
section 215 the following new section:
``SEC. 215A. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY.
``(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
``(1) Bulk-power system; electric reliability organization;
regional entity.--The terms `bulk-power system', `Electric
Reliability Organization', and `regional entity' have the
meanings given such terms in paragraphs (1), (2), and (7) of
section 215(a), respectively.
``(2) Defense critical electric infrastructure.--The term
`defense critical electric infrastructure' means any
infrastructure located in the United States (including the
territories) used for the generation, transmission, or
distribution of electric energy that--
``(A) is not part of the bulk-power system; and
``(B) serves a facility designated by the President
pursuant to subsection (d)(1), but is not owned or
operated by the owner or operator of such facility.
``(3) Defense critical electric infrastructure
vulnerability.--The term `defense critical electric
infrastructure vulnerability' means a weakness in defense
critical electric infrastructure that, in the event of a
malicious act using an electromagnetic pulse, would pose a
substantial risk of disruption of those electrical or
electronic devices or communications networks, including
hardware, software, and data, that are essential to the
reliability of defense critical electric infrastructure.
``(4) Electromagnetic pulse.--The term `electromagnetic
pulse' means 1 or more pulses of electromagnetic energy
generated or emitted by a device capable of disabling,
disrupting, or destroying electronic equipment by means of such
a pulse.
``(5) Geomagnetic storm.--The term `geomagnetic storm'
means a temporary disturbance of the Earth's magnetic field
resulting from solar activity.
``(6) Grid security threat.--The term `grid security
threat' means a substantial likelihood of--
``(A) a malicious act using an electromagnetic
pulse, or a geomagnetic storm event, that could disrupt
the operation of those electrical or electronic devices
or communications networks, including hardware,
software, and data, that are essential to the
reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense
critical electric infrastructure; and
``(B) disruption of the operation of such devices
or networks, with significant adverse effects on the
reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense
critical electric infrastructure, as a result of such
act or event.
``(7) Grid security vulnerability.--The term `grid security
vulnerability' means a weakness that, in the event of a
malicious act using an electromagnetic pulse, would pose a
substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those
electrical or electronic devices or communications networks,
including hardware, software, and data, that are essential to
the reliability of the bulk-power system.
``(8) Large transformer.--The term `large transformer'
means an electric transformer that is part of the bulk-power
system.
``(9) Protected information.--The term `protected
information' means information, other than classified national
security information, designated as protected information by
the Commission under subsection (e)(2)--
``(A) that was developed or submitted in connection
with the implementation of this section;
``(B) that specifically discusses grid security
threats, grid security vulnerabilities, defense
critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities, or
plans, procedures, or measures to address such threats
or vulnerabilities; and
``(C) the unauthorized disclosure of which could be
used in a malicious manner to impair the reliability of
the bulk-power system or of defense critical electric
infrastructure.
``(10) Secretary.--The term `Secretary' means the Secretary
of Energy.
``(11) Security.--The definition of `security' in section
3(16) shall not apply to the provisions in this section.
``(b) Emergency Response Measures.--
``(1) Authority to address grid security threats.--Whenever
the President issues and provides to the Commission (either
directly or through the Secretary) a written directive or
determination identifying an imminent grid security threat, the
Commission may, with or without notice, hearing, or report,
issue such orders for emergency measures as are necessary in
its judgment to protect the reliability of the bulk-power
system or of defense critical electric infrastructure against
such threat. As soon as practicable, but not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this section, the
Commission shall, after notice and opportunity for comment,
establish rules of procedure that ensure that such authority
can be exercised expeditiously.
``(2) Notification of congress.--Whenever the President
issues and provides to the Commission (either directly or
through the Secretary) a written directive or determination
under paragraph (1), the President (or the Secretary, as the
case may be) shall promptly notify congressional committees of
relevant jurisdiction, including the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate, of the contents of,
and justification for, such directive or determination.
``(3) Consultation.--Before issuing an order for emergency
measures under paragraph (1), the Commission shall, to the
extent practicable in light of the nature of the grid security
threat and the urgency of the need for such emergency measures,
consult with appropriate governmental authorities in Canada and
Mexico, entities described in paragraph (4), the Secretary, and
other appropriate Federal agencies regarding implementation of
such emergency measures.
``(4) Application.--An order for emergency measures under
this subsection may apply to--
``(A) the Electric Reliability Organization;
``(B) a regional entity; or
``(C) any owner, user, or operator of the bulk-
power system or of defense critical electric
infrastructure within the United States.
``(5) Discontinuance.--The Commission shall issue an order
discontinuing any emergency measures ordered under this
subsection, effective not later than 30 days after the earliest
of the following:
``(A) The date upon which the President issues and
provides to the Commission (either directly or through
the Secretary) a written directive or determination
that the grid security threat identified under
paragraph (1) no longer exists.
``(B) The date upon which the Commission issues a
written determination that the emergency measures are
no longer needed to address the grid security threat
identified under paragraph (1), including by means of
Commission approval of a reliability standard under
section 215 that the Commission determines adequately
addresses such threat.
``(C) The date that is 1 year after the issuance of
an order under paragraph (1).
``(6) Cost recovery.--If the Commission determines that
owners, operators, or users of the bulk-power system or of
defense critical electric infrastructure have incurred
substantial costs to comply with an order under this subsection
or subsection (c) and that such costs were prudently incurred
and cannot reasonably be recovered through regulated rates or
market prices for the electric energy or services sold by such
owners, operators, or users, the Commission shall, after notice
and an opportunity for comment, establish a mechanism that
permits such owners, operators, or users to recover such costs.
``(c) Measures To Address Grid Security Vulnerabilities.--
``(1) Commission authority.--If the Commission, in
consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, identifies a
grid security vulnerability that the Commission determines has
not adequately been addressed through a reliability standard
developed and approved under section 215, the Commission shall,
after notice and opportunity for comment and after consultation
with the Secretary, other appropriate Federal agencies, and
appropriate governmental authorities in Canada and Mexico,
promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring implementation,
by any owner, operator, or user of the bulk-power system in the
United States, of measures to protect the bulk-power system
against such vulnerability. Any such rule or order shall
include a protection plan, including automated hardware-based
solutions. Before promulgating a rule or issuing an order under
this paragraph, the Commission shall, to the extent practicable
in light of the urgency of the need for action to address the
grid security vulnerability, request and consider
recommendations from the Electric Reliability Organization
regarding such rule or order. The Commission may establish an
appropriate deadline for the submission of such
recommendations.
``(2) Rescission.--The Commission shall approve a
reliability standard developed under section 215 that addresses
a grid security vulnerability that is the subject of a rule or
order under paragraph (1), unless the Commission determines
that such reliability standard does not adequately protect
against such vulnerability or otherwise does not satisfy the
requirements of section 215. Upon such approval, the Commission
shall rescind the rule promulgated or order issued under
paragraph (1) addressing such vulnerability, effective upon the
effective date of the newly approved reliability standard.
``(3) Geomagnetic storms and electromagnetic pulse.--Not
later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this
section, the Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity
for comment and after consultation with the Secretary and other
appropriate Federal agencies, issue an order directing the
Electric Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission
for approval under section 215, not later than 6 months after
the issuance of such order, reliability standards adequate to
protect the bulk-power system from any reasonably foreseeable
geomagnetic storm or electromagnetic pulse event. The
Commission's order shall specify the nature and magnitude of
the reasonably foreseeable events against which such standards
must protect. Such standards shall appropriately balance the
risks to the bulk-power system associated with such events,
including any regional variation in such risks, and the costs
of mitigating such risks. If the Commission determines that the
reliability standards submitted by the Electric Reliability
Organization pursuant to this paragraph are inadequate, the
Commission shall promulgate a rule or issue an order adequate
to protect the bulk-power system from geomagnetic storms or
electromagnetic pulse as required under paragraph (1).
``(4) Large transformer availability.--Not later than 1
year after the date of enactment of this section, the
Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment
and after consultation with the Secretary and other appropriate
Federal agencies, issue an order directing the Electric
Reliability Organization to submit to the Commission for
approval under section 215, not later than 1 year after the
issuance of such order, reliability standards addressing
availability of large transformers. Such standards shall
require entities that own or operate large transformers to
ensure, individually or jointly, adequate availability of large
transformers to promptly restore the reliable operation of the
bulk-power system in the event that any such transformer is
destroyed or disabled as a result of a geomagnetic storm event
or electromagnetic pulse event. The Commission's order shall
specify the nature and magnitude of the reasonably foreseeable
events that shall provide the basis for such standards. Such
standards shall--
``(A) provide entities subject to the standards
with the option of meeting such standards individually
or jointly; and
``(B) appropriately balance the risks associated
with a reasonably foreseeable event, including any
regional variation in such risks, and the costs of
ensuring adequate availability of spare transformers.
``(d) Critical Defense Facilities.--
``(1) Designation.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of this section, the President shall designate, in
a written directive or determination provided to the
Commission, facilities located in the United States (including
the territories) that are--
``(A) critical to the defense of the United States;
and
``(B) vulnerable to a disruption of the supply of
electric energy provided to such facility by an
external provider.
The number of facilities designated by such directive or
determination shall not exceed 100. The President may
periodically revise the list of designated facilities through a
subsequent written directive or determination provided to the
Commission, provided that the total number of designated
facilities at any time shall not exceed 100.
``(2) Commission authority.--If the Commission identifies a
defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerability that the
Commission, in consultation with owners and operators of any
facility or facilities designated by the President pursuant to
paragraph (1), determines has not adequately been addressed
through measures undertaken by owners or operators of defense
critical electric infrastructure, the Commission shall, after
notice and an opportunity for comment and after consultation
with the Secretary and other appropriate Federal agencies,
promulgate a rule or issue an order requiring implementation,
by any owner or operator of defense critical electric
infrastructure, of measures to protect the defense critical
electric infrastructure against such vulnerability. The
Commission shall exempt from any such rule or order any
specific defense critical electric infrastructure that the
Commission determines already has been adequately protected
against the identified vulnerability. The Commission shall make
any such determination in consultation with the owner or
operator of the facility designated by the President pursuant
to paragraph (1) that relies upon such defense critical
electric infrastructure.
``(3) Cost recovery.--An owner or operator of defense
critical electric infrastructure shall be required to take
measures under paragraph (2) only to the extent that the owners
or operators of a facility or facilities designated by the
President pursuant to paragraph (1) that rely upon such
infrastructure agree to bear the full incremental costs of
compliance with a rule promulgated or order issued under
paragraph (2).
``(e) Protection of Information.--
``(1) Prohibition of public disclosure of protected
information.--Protected information shall--
``(A) be exempt from disclosure under section
552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code; and
``(B) not be made available pursuant to any State,
local, or tribal law requiring disclosure of
information or records.
``(2) Information sharing.--
``(A) In general.--Consistent with the Controlled
Unclassified Information framework established by the
President, the Commission shall promulgate such
regulations and issue such orders as necessary to
designate protected information and to prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of such protected information.
``(B) Sharing of protected information.--The
regulations promulgated and orders issued pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall provide standards for and
facilitate the appropriate sharing of protected
information with, between, and by Federal, State,
local, and tribal authorities, the Electric Reliability
Organization, regional entities, and owners, operators,
and users of the bulk-power system in the United States
and of defense critical electric infrastructure. In
promulgating such regulations and issuing such orders,
the Commission shall take account of the role of State
commissions in reviewing the prudence and cost of
investments within their respective jurisdictions. The
Commission shall consult with appropriate Canadian and
Mexican authorities to develop protocols for the
sharing of protected information with, between, and by
appropriate Canadian and Mexican authorities and
owners, operators, and users of the bulk-power system
outside the United States.
``(3) Submission of information to congress.--Nothing in
this section shall permit or authorize the withholding of
information from Congress, any committee or subcommittee
thereof, or the Comptroller General.
``(4) Disclosure of nonprotected information.--In
implementing this section, the Commission shall protect from
disclosure only the minimum amount of information necessary to
protect the reliability of the bulk-power system and of defense
critical electric infrastructure. The Commission shall
segregate protected information within documents and electronic
communications, wherever feasible, to facilitate disclosure of
information that is not designated as protected information.
``(5) Duration of designation.--Information may not be
designated as protected information for longer than 5 years,
unless specifically redesignated by the Commission.
``(6) Removal of designation.--The Commission may remove
the designation of protected information, in whole or in part,
from a document or electronic communication if the unauthorized
disclosure of such information could no longer be used to
impair the reliability of the bulk-power system or of defense
critical electric infrastructure.
``(7) Judicial review of designations.--Notwithstanding
subsection (f) of this section or section 313, a person or
entity may seek judicial review of a determination by the
Commission concerning the designation of protected information
under this subsection exclusively in the district court of the
United States in the district in which the complainant resides,
or has his principal place of business, or in the District of
Columbia. In such a case the court shall determine the matter
de novo, and may examine the contents of documents or
electronic communications designated as protected information
in camera to determine whether such documents or any part
thereof were improperly designated as protected information.
The burden is on the Commission to sustain its designation.
``(f) Judicial Review.--The Commission shall act expeditiously to
resolve all applications for rehearing of orders issued pursuant to
this section that are filed under section 313(a). Any party seeking
judicial review pursuant to section 313 of an order issued under this
section may obtain such review only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
``(g) Provision of Assistance to Industry in Meeting Grid Security
Protection Needs.--
``(1) Expertise and resources.--The Secretary shall
establish a program, in consultation with other appropriate
Federal agencies, to develop technical expertise in the
protection of systems for the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric energy against geomagnetic storms or
malicious acts using electromagnetic pulse that would pose a
substantial risk of disruption to the operation of those
electronic devices or communications networks, including
hardware, software, and data, that are essential to the
reliability of such systems. Such program shall include the
identification and development of appropriate technical and
electronic resources, including hardware, software, and system
equipment.
``(2) Sharing expertise.--As appropriate, the Secretary
shall offer to share technical expertise developed under the
program under paragraph (1), through consultation and
assistance, with owners, operators, or users of systems for the
generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy
located in the United States and with State commissions. In
offering such support, the Secretary shall assign higher
priority to systems serving facilities designated by the
President pursuant to subsection (d)(1) and other critical-
infrastructure facilities, which the Secretary shall identify
in consultation with the Commission and other appropriate
Federal agencies.
``(3) Security clearances and communication.--The Secretary
shall facilitate and, to the extent practicable, expedite the
acquisition of adequate security clearances by key personnel of
any entity subject to the requirements of this section to
enable optimum communication with Federal agencies regarding
grid security threats, grid security vulnerabilities, and
defense critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities. The
Secretary, the Commission, and other appropriate Federal
agencies shall, to the extent practicable and consistent with
their obligations to protect classified and protected
information, share timely actionable information regarding grid
security threats, grid security vulnerabilities, and defense
critical electric infrastructure vulnerabilities with
appropriate key personnel of owners, operators, and users of
the bulk-power system and of defense critical electric
infrastructure.
``(h) Certain Federal Entities.--For the 11-year period commencing
on the date of enactment of this section, the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the Bonneville Power Administration shall be exempt from
any requirement under subsection (b) or (c).''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Jurisdiction.--Section 201(b)(2) of the Federal Power
Act (16 U.S.C. 824(b)(2)) is amended by inserting ``215A,''
after ``215,'' each place it appears.
(2) Public utility.--Section 201(e) of the Federal Power
Act (16 U.S.C. 824(e)) is amended by inserting ``215A,'' after
``215,''.
SEC. 4. BUDGETARY COMPLIANCE.
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying
with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by
reference to the latest statement titled ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO
Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the Congressional
Record by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that
such statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.
<all>
Introduced in House
Introduced in House
Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
Referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
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