Nuclear Arms Stability Act

Nuclear Arms Stability Act - Prohibits the use of FY 1985 appropriations for: (1) the procurement of the anti-satellite weapon system, the Space Defense Program; (2) flight testing any anti-satellite weapon while the Soviet Union observes its existing moratorium against such testing; and (3) the development and testing of an advanced anti-satellite weapon while the Soviet Union observes its existing moratorium against testing rocket-boosted interceptor anti-satellite weapons in space.

Limits the amount of appropriations which may be used for programs forming the Strategic Defense Initiative program of the Department of Defense. Directs the Secretary of Defense to include a report on the funding of such programs with the annual Department budget request for FY 1986-1990.

Prohibits the use of FY 1985 appropriations for the procurement or development of any strategic nuclear weapon, nuclear weapon system, or launcher for such weapon or system if to do so would contravene existing strategic arms policies as declared by the President in his 1982 Memorial Day address. Waives such limitations if the President certifies, with 30 days notice, that it is in the supreme national interest of the United States that such limitations no longer apply.

Prohibits the Secretary from deploying a cruise missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead and be launched from a naval vessel until: (1) the President reports to Congress a method to determine whether such a missile is conventionally or nuclear armed and it is possible to verify the number of nuclear armed missiles; and (2) Congress specifically authorizes such deployment.

Subjects Department of Energy appropriations for the W80-0 nuclear warhead for the tactical land attack missile-nuclear (TLAM-N) to the same restrictions. Prohibits the use of Department funds for the testing and production of the W81 warhead or for development of other warheads for anti-submarine weapons. Directs the President to report to Congress by January 19, 1985, justifying the continued reliance on nuclear warheads for tactical battlefield use.

Directs the President to report to Congress regarding the net reduction by the United States in the number of tactical nuclear warheads in the territory of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European member nations.

Requires the President to report to Congress by January 19, 1985, on the rationale behind renovating or not renovating the NATO nuclear deterrent to reduce pressures for an early first strike and to reduce the nuclear arsenal, including NATO reliance on short-range nuclear weapons and the joining of control of tactical nuclear weapons in a single specialized command.

Directs the Secretary of Defense to report to the Armed Services Committees of Congress by January 19, 1985, on the survivability of the U.S. strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine force. Directs the President to report to Congress by that same date on the required strategic counterforce capability of the United States consistent with the policy set forth in the President's letter of May 11, 1983, to Representative Albert Gore, Junior, in which the President agreed with the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation that the United States not develop a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. Requires such report to include current and proposed U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles capability, including the MX missile, the D5 Trident missile, and the small single-warhead missile.