To commend the President for the conventional arms reduction initiative announced in Brussels on May 29, 1989, and to require the President to submit to Congress a report on the foreign policy and military implications of further reductions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact alliances in the levels of conventional military forces in Europe.

Commends and supports the President's arms initiatives announced in Bussels in May 1989, under which the President proposed that NATO expand its position in negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe to include substantial reductions by each side to equal ceilings of helicopters and combat aircraft and a reduction to a common ceiling of U.S. military personnel in Western Europe and Soviet military personnel in Eastern Europe.

Directs the President to report to the Congress on the foreign policy and military implications to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact of significant reductions of conventional forces to a ceiling which is the same for both sides. Requires the report to be prepared under two different scenarios: one assuming a 25 percent reduction in NATO levels of personnel and troops and the other assuming a 50 percent reduction in such levels.

 
HR 2574 IH
101st CONGRESS
1st Session
 H. R. 2574
To commend the President for the conventional arms reduction initiative
announced in Brussels on May 29, 1989, and to require the President to
submit to Congress a report on the foreign policy and military implications
of further reductions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw
Pact alliances in the levels of conventional military forces in Europe.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 7, 1989
Mr. GEJDENSON (for himself, Mr. MAVROULES, and Mr. ASPIN) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
A BILL
To commend the President for the conventional arms reduction initiative
announced in Brussels on May 29, 1989, and to require the President to
submit to Congress a report on the foreign policy and military implications
of further reductions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw
Pact alliances in the levels of conventional military forces in Europe.
  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
  States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. IMPLICATIONS OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE
BY NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBER NATIONS.
  (a) FINDINGS- Congress makes the following findings:
  (1) Representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
  the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact) are currently engaged in
  negotiations (begun in Vienna on March 9, 1989, and known as the `CFE Talks')
  seeking to achieve an agreement to enhance security and stability in Europe
  through reductions in the levels of conventional military forces in Europe.
  (2) The member nations of NATO have recently reaffirmed (in the NATO report
  entitled `A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament') the
  following objectives of the NATO alliance in those negotiations:
  (A) The establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional
  military forces in Europe between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances at
  a level of forces lower than currently exists.
  (B) The elimination of disparities in existing force levels that are
  prejudicial to stability and security in Europe.
  (C) The elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability
  for either side to launch a surprise attack or to initiate large-scale
  offensive action.
  (3) Both alliances have accepted in principle the position that numerical
  parity in conventional forces (both in the aggregate and with respect to
  specific types of equipment) would serve the goal of establishing a more
  stable balance of forces.
  (4) The military and political effects upon security and stability in
  Europe of deep reductions in conventional forces in Europe (even if carried
  out mutually and in accordance with the principle of numerical parity)
  are not fully understood and, accordingly, require further analysis.
  (5) Congress, facing critical decisions for fiscal year 1990, and for
  subsequent fiscal years, in the allocation of scarce budgetary resources,
  could find those decisions significantly influenced by the results of the
  negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe referred to in
  paragraph (1).
  (b) COMMENDATION OF PRESIDENT'S CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION INITIATIVE-
  Congress commends and supports the President's bold conventional arms
  initiative announced in Brussels on May 29, 1989, in which the President
  proposes that NATO expand its negotiating position at the negotiations on
  conventional force reductions in Europe to include substantial reductions
  by each side to equal ceilings of helicopters and combat aircraft and
  a reduction to a common ceiling of United States military personnel in
  Western Europe and Soviet military personnel in Eastern Europe.
  (c) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT- (1) Not later than six months after the date
  of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress
  an unclassified report, with classified annexes as necessary, on the
  foreign policy and military implications to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact
  of significant reductions of conventional forces by NATO and Warsaw Pact
  countries to a ceiling which is the same for both sides.
  (2) The report shall be prepared based upon an analysis of two different
  scenarios for the force reductions to be made. Under the first scenario,
  the reductions shall be to a level 25 percent below current NATO levels
  of personnel and equipment. Under the second scenario, reductions shall be
  to a level 50 percent below current NATO levels of personnel and equipment.
  (3) The report shall include the following:
  (A) A description of the likely alternative force postures that could be
  adopted by member nations of both alliances (particularly by the United
  States and the Soviet Union) under each scenario analyzed, together with
  a description of the possible effects of restructuring of both NATO and
  Warsaw Pact forces in Europe for defensive purposes.
  (B) A statement of the costs (or savings) to the United States, over at
  least a seven-year period, estimated to be associated with each force
  posture described under subparagraph (A), together with an analysis of
  how those costs (or savings) were determined.
  (C) An analysis of the implications for NATO strategy, security, and
  military policy of the two scenarios analyzed pursuant to paragraph (2).
  (D) An assessment of the effects of the two scenarios (including the
  alternative force postures under each scenario) upon the stability of the
  conventional balance of forces in Europe.