Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act

Intelligence Activities Oversight Improvement Act - Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to repeal provisions prohibiting the use of funds by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for covert action ("special activities") in the absence of a presidential finding that such action is important for national security.

Amends the National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit the initiation of any special activity by any U.S. department, agency, or entity, or any private entity acting on behalf of the United States, unless and until the activity has been approved by the President and the President has made a written finding that: (1) such activity is essential to the national defense or the conduct of U.S. foreign policy; (2) such activity is consistent with, and in support of, the publicly avowed foreign policy of the United States; (3) the anticipated benefits of such activity justify the risks and consequences of its disclosure to a foreign power; (4) overt or less sensitive alternatives would not be likely to achieve the intended objectives; and (5) the circumstances require the use of extraordinary means. Requires such finding to designate the entity which is to carry out the special activity and to specify the authorized duration (not to exceed one year) of the special activity. (Current law does not require a written finding, or that a designated entity be specifically authorized to carry out the special activity.)

Requires the President to submit, before a major special activity is commenced, a report to the intelligence committees of Congress containing the written finding and a description of the nature, scope, and specific objectives of the activity.

Allows the President, upon a finding that there exist extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests and that time is of the essence in initiating such activity, to limit the prior notice required under this Act to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, but not beyond 48 hours after the written finding. Requires that, in such cases, the President provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice to the intelligence committees.

Requires the President to provide any additional information that either intelligence committee might require about special activities reported. Makes the National Security Council responsible for the supervision of each such activity and for ensuring that the activity remains consistent with the nature, scope, and objectives authorized by the President.

Allows the President to authorize special activities not involving elements of high risk, major resources, or serious political consequences by category rather than as individual projects where he finds such activities important to U.S. national security, and where he reports, before any action is commenced, to the intelligence committees.

Defines special activity to mean any activity conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Prohibits the National Security Council from engaging in or carrying out special activities.